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STATE OF UTAH,
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE UNIDENTIFIED MALE AIDED OR ENCOURAGED THE
OFFENSE

The State concedes that there was insufficient evidence that the two females
present at the scene did not aid or encourage the offense. See App. Br. at 11, n.5. The
State asserts, however, that the unidentified male provided sufficient evidence to support
the group criminal activity enhancement. See Id. at 9-11. The State's argument is not
supported by the record.
The State marshals the following evidence to support its assertion that the
unidentified male aided or encouraged the offense: the male was standing outside the car,
a silver spray paint cap was found next to the car, and the male left the scene when the
security officer arrived. See App. Br. at 10. In sum, the State asserts that evidence of the
unidentified male's flight from the scene coupled with this other evidence is sufficient to
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support the jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the male aided or encouraged the
offense.
The State relies on State v. Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, 10 P.3d 346, for the
proposition that this ccflight" evidence is sufficient to support the finding that the
unidentified male "aided or encouraged" the offense. See App. Br. at 10; see also Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. However, the facts and circumstantial evidence in Holgate do
not support the State's assertions in this case.
In Holgate, the defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated burglary. 2000
UT App 74, \ 1. The evidence showed that two days before the murder, the victim, along
with two friends, went to the defendant's apartment to purchase drugs. Id. at ^| 3. There
was a dispute over the price, and the victim angrily left, exclaiming that he had been
cheated. Id.
Later that same date, the victim made numerous threats to the defendant and
defendant's family for stealing his money, stating that they would be taken hostage.
Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, ^f 4. The police were called, and officers escorted the victim
to defendant's residence to discuss and resolve the matter. Id.
Two days later, the defendant called the victim and let him know that he was
coming to his apartment. Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, ^f 5. The defendant was
accompanied by another male, who did not really know the victim and was not threatened
by the victim. Id. Upon arrival at the victim's apartment, the defendant knocked and was
greeted by the victim's friend, while the defendant's friend stood out of sight by the door.
Id. The defendant asked the victim to come outside, and as the victim came to the door
2

and asked the defendant to come inside, the defendant stepped backwards, grinning,
while the defendant's friend came inside the apartment with both hands behind his back.
Id. Once inside, the defendant's friend asked the victim, "Hey, what's up, bro?" to which
the victim replied, "What's up?" Then the defendant's friend asked the victim in a
threatening voice, "What are you going to do now?" and pulled a gun from behind his
back and shot and killed the victim. Id. atfflf5-6. During this time, the defendant stood
outside and was still grinning. Id. at ^J 5.
After the shooting, the defendant and his friend ran together down the stairs, along
a sidewalk and across a parking lot to a vehicle nearby, with another person already in the
driver's seat, and the defendant said to the shooter, "Get in, G." Id. at Iflj's 6, 22. The
vehicle left so quickly that the tires squealed as they sped away. Id.
The police quickly apprehended the suspects, and asked why they had been
stopped. Id. at ^f 7. The defendant responded, "Because somebody talking shit got dealt
with." The murder weapon was found in the vehicle and the defendant had gunpowder
residue on his clothes. Id. Moreover, while being transported to the police station, the
defendant asked the officer, "Does this have anything to do with what happened in West
Valley [the place of the incident]?" Id.
At trial, despite the defendant's statements to the police, the defendant testified
that he learned that the victim had been shot about two or three hours after the shooting
when he was being interrogated at the police station. Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, ^f 7. The
defendant also testified that he knew the shooter had a gun, but later testified that he did
not see it. Id. at f 22. The defendant also claimed that he went to the victim's apartment
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only to return the disputed money. Id. at *J| 8. However, the defendant conceded that the
money was not returned and a search of the vehicle revealed insufficient money to pay
back the victim. Id.
On appeal, the defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the
murder and burglary convictions. Id. at \ 10. This Court held that for the case to be
submitted to the jury, "there had to be sufficient evidence, including the logical and
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, that Holgate was a knowing
participant in the killing of Gallegos." Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, ^ 22.
This Court held that the jury could reasonably infer from all of the evidence that
the defendant "had a motive to kill" the victim due to the threats just two days before and
by telling the shooter that the victim was still a threat. Id. at 1f 23. The Court further held
that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant concealed the shooter's presence at
the door in order to lure the victim to the door in order to get a clear shot. Id. The Court
also held that the jury could infer that the defendant knew the shooter brought a gun. Id.
In addition, the Court observed that from all of these circumstances, as well as the
circumstances of the flight after the shooting, the jury could reasonably infer that there
was a plan in advance to commit the murder. Holgate, 2000 UT App 74, \ 23. This
included the defendant and the shooter fleeing together and running to a parked car that
already had a person in the driver's seat, the defendant telling the shooter to "Get in, G",
and leaving in a hurried manner. Id.
Thus, the Court found that from these "reasonable inferences and the evidence
before the trial court, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Holgate intentionally
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and knowingly participated in the killing.... [and] there was sufficient evidence to
convict the defendant of murder." Id. at % 24.
Cristobal asserts that in this case, the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom does not rise to the level of the evidence in Holgate, which supported the
finding of accomplice liability. Unlike Holgate, there is no direct evidence in this case
that the unidentified male aided or encouraged the offense. The testimony merely
showed that when the security officer approached the corner of the store, he observed an
"adult male run northbound" away from the store (R. 189: 53-54). Notably, the
unidentified male did not leave the scene with either of the defendants, unlike the facts in
Holgate (R. 189: 53-54). In addition, there was no testimony that the unidentified male
was even aware of the graffiti or participated in painting the graffiti (R. 189: 53-54).
The State acknowledges this paucity of evidence, and aptly notes that "fm]ere
presence, or even knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he neither advises,
instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime." See App. Br. at 9;
(quoting State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah App. 1998) (quotation omitted)).
Instead, the State asserts that the unidentified male's "flight" from the scene, coupled
with other evidence, is sufficient evidence of his "complicity". See App. Br. at 10-11.
The record, however, shows that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict that the unidentified male did anything to advise, instigate, encourage, or assist in
perpetration of the crime.
The State supports its assertion that the fact that the unidentified male left the
scene shows his complicity by speculating that the unidentified male was acting as a
5

lookout. See App. Br. at 11. The evidence shows, however, that the male made no
attempt to alert Cristobal or Juan to the security officer's presence (R. 189: 53-60).
Instead, while the male left the scene, both Cristobal and Juan stayed there, apparently
unaware initially of the security officer's presence (R. 189: 53-60). In fact, it was only
when the security officer approached on foot that Juan attempted to hide (R. 189: 54).
Had the unidentified male been acting as a lookout, it is likely that he would have alerted
the others to the security officer's presence and they would have all left the scene
together. The fact that this did not occur strongly suggests that the State's speculation
otherwise is incorrect.
The State further speculates that the unidentified male was standing nearby the
silver spray cap, connecting him to the crime. See App. Br. at 10. However, there was
no evidence that the male was standing next to the spray paint cap or that he was even
aware of it. The evidence was only that the male was standing outside the car talking
with the two girls and that a silver spray cap was also found outside the car (R. 189: 53,
60, 130). There was also no evidence that the male was standing on the same side of the
vehicle that the spray paint cap was found (R. 189: 53, 60, 130).
The State further speculates that Cristobal and the male agreed to meet at the store
and spray paint it, and that the unidentified male had already begun the graffiti and that
Cristobal and Juan were only completing the job. See App. Br. at 10. This assertion is
not supported by the facts, however, considering that the blue spray paint cap was found
in the car, suggesting that the vehicle occupants brought the spray paint to the crime
scene, and the fact that Juan had possession of both spray cans (R. 189: 62, 129).
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Thus, the "other circumstantial evidence" that supposedly supports the State's
assertion that the unidentified male's departure from the scene was sufficient to support
the jury's verdict is undermined by the actual record. The fact that the unidentified male
was initially standing outside the vehicle talking to the two girls and then left the scene
upon the security officer's arrival does not provide sufficient evidence wherewith a jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the unidentified male aided or encouraged
the crime.
While speculation can and did run rampant in this case as to the unidentified
male's motives for leaving the scene, there is simply insufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the unidentified male aided or encouraged the offense.
The State presented no evidence with which a reasonable jury could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the unidentified male aided or encouraged the crime. 1 he
State's assertion that the unidentified male acted in concert with Cristobal and Juan to
commit the offense is based entirely on speculation and conjecture. Accordingly, there
was insufficient evidence to support the enhanced penalty. Therefore, the trial court
should have granted Cristobal's motion for directed verdict to dismiss the enhancement
provision of § 76-3-203.1.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Cristobal asks this Court to reverse his second degree
felony conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of March, 2010.

Aaron P. Dodd
Counsel for Appellee
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